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Part I
Introduction
The conduct of war in the 
21st century

The Conduct of War in the 21st Century offers significant changes to the 
framework of thinking about armed conflict in three respects. First, it 
 updates current thinking on warfighting, weaving together different strands 
of thought that have emerged in the wake of the conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Libya, and Syria which occurred between 2001 and 2020. Second, it 
expands upon the conduct of the 21st-century style of war that includes 
both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, which is waged both in traditional 
and in new domains, and which occurs in developed as well as developing 
polities. Third, it offers new insights into the impact new technologies are 
having on the conduct of war, including cyber and information, artificial 
intelligence (AI), unmanned and semi-autonomous systems, satellites, and 
a new generation of missiles.
This volume is not about the future of war but provides a clear as-
sessment of the lessons that can be derived from the conduct of war in 
various theatres around the world. The different parts touch on key 
 manifestations of strategy, technology, air power, war from the ground 
up, law, and  decision-making. These salient themes in the execution of 
 contemporary warfare are further explored in chapters that place the 
 relevant  developments over the last two decades within the context of the 
intellectual challenge of thinking about war. The volume thereby  examines 
key dimensions in the conduct of war (the human, the technological, the 
strategic-operational-tactical, the procedural, and the legal), and shows 
that our thinking about war, particularly what it is and how it is fought, 
needs to be updated.
The three cross-cutting key terms around which the volume coheres are 
Kinetic, Connected, and Synthetic. We examine war as a kinetic activity, ap-
plying the original Greek meaning of kinesis as pressure, flow, and force, 
since electronic warfare, just like its physical equivalent, depends on each 
of these qualities. We investigate the impact of the connected element of 
war – between peoples, between ideas, through systems, communications, 
networks, and even across time. Finally, we examine the extent to which 
war is synthetic, that is seemingly dominated by artificial and manufactured 
elements, but with an enduring role of the human.
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This volume therefore marks a new departure in the study of contempo-
rary war, in that it concentrates on the solutions that have been advanced in 
theory and practice to deal with the challenges wars have posed in the first 
decades of the 21st century. It charts the new agenda that has emerged. It 
is specifically an inter-disciplinary work, brought together by the common 
and urgent demands created by armed conflict. It is neither a specialised 
survey of all technologies, nor a staff college guide to current warfighting, 
since these professional studies already exist. It does not seek to provide 
an exhaustive overview of all aspects relevant to the conduct of contempo-
rary war. It is, instead, a problematised selection which offers a framework 
of thinking in combination with critical analyses of the dominant elements 
that characterise the conduct of war of the first quarter of the 21st century.
Military professionals and scholars share an interest in how to identify 
and assess change in armed conflict, and, at war colleges across the Western 
world, they study with great intensity its ways, that is, the actual conduct of 
war. They are concerned with legal and ethical considerations, the relative 
utility of force compared with other instruments of power, and new technol-
ogies and their impact on how fighting forces and irregular actors make use 
of them. In 2010, the Oxford Changing Character of War scholars published 
a volume with Oxford University Press to examine the character of war 
in past and present conditions, and what emerged was that, despite some 
changes in the types of actors and their practices (such as the employment 
of cyber systems), there were striking continuities.1 In that year, with sig-
nificant insurgencies against the Western powers and their allies underway, 
there was perhaps a stronger focus on the violent non-state actor. In the years 
that followed there were further technological innovations and  considerable 
political and economic changes. These have driven an evolution in the char-
acter, if not the nature, of war. At the beginning of the third decade of the 
21st century, we are eager to assess what has changed in the conduct of war, 
and get a better understanding of its emerging characteristics.
A centennial of thinking about the conduct of war
The inspiration for this volume is the work of the inter-war years theorists, 
between 1919 and 1939, who had begun their deliberations in the aftermath 
of a significant global war a century ago. They were compelled to reflect on 
what had occurred but also to consider what lay ahead. Was there a future 
where international institutions could regulate and even prevent war, or was 
there the prospect of new and barbaric forms of conflict? They speculated 
about the impact of new technologies, such as armour, aviation, and wireless 
communications, and how to harness them. There was widespread concern 
about the use of poison gas, the prospect of heavy casualties in mechanised 
land battles, and the widespread destruction of cities by air bombardment. 
Crucially, these analysts offered a framework of thinking about the conduct 
of war during a time of considerable political and technological change.
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The starting point for this volume, therefore, is J.F.C. ‘Boney’ Fuller, who 
was, like some of our authors, a military officer, historian of war, strategic 
thinker, and advocate of new technological solutions. In 1926, he tried to 
codify the conduct of war based on an analysis of the global armed conflict 
that had such a significant impact on his generation, and, two years later, 
he considered the longer term future of warfare.2 In most of his 45 books, 
written across his career, he believed that the purpose of new technologies 
and original techniques was to create a psychological effect. Herein lies our 
first connection with the present, for what we see, especially in terms of new 
technologies, at first seems to herald some breakthrough or a ‘revolution 
in military affairs’. Instead, what is striking is that the use of those tech-
nologies is still targeted at, and dependent upon, the endurance, skills, and 
psychological resilience of the human.
Writing in the Interbellum, Fuller was eager to clarify what could be 
learned, and applied, from the conduct of war in his own time, and his prin-
ciples, with some modification, remain in use with modern Western armies. 
He summed up these principles in three groups: Control (the direction of 
operations and mobility), Pressure (concentration of force, surprise, and 
offensive action), and Resistance (distributed forces, endurance, and secu-
rity). Our approach, building on Fuller, therefore advocates the idea that the 
character of the current conduct in war is kinetic, connected, and synthetic, 
with humans still at its core. Fuller’s control, pressure, and resistance are 
applicable to all three of our trinitarian elements. ‘Control’, in the form of 
direction, leadership, communications, allocation of resources, or an econ-
omy of effort, can be found in each of our elements – in the kinetic aspect of 
operations, in the connected nature of it, and in the synthetic. Ethical and 
legal norms considered are all elements of control, and feature in debates on 
the use of automated systems. Equally, for ‘Pressure’, we find characteristics 
in all three of our elements, including the concentration of force in precision 
kinetic air strikes, in connected cyber disruption operations, and in coercive 
policies in the so-called grey zone. ‘Resistance’ appears in all three elements 
too, in physical kinetic resistance, in connectivity, and in the use of syn-
thetic systems. In other words, we imagine two trinities, one superimposed 
upon the other, each applicable to the other. We have therefore created a set 
of three observable characteristics to add to Fuller’s original conception, 
 arguing that, in the context of the early 21st century, the grammar of war is 
kinetic, connected, and synthetic.
Conceptual clarification of the military-human implications of techno-
logical change is a connection with this volume, since the advent of new 
technologies and systems today has created a degree of confusion and 
 uncertainty. This is reflected not only in debates concerning the rules and 
regulations guiding legitimate conduct in war in new domains. State ac-
tors’ exploitation of an unwillingness to cross the threshold of war, while 
using violence, disruptive deception, and the speed accorded by informa-
tion operations, constitutes a serious challenge to the strategic balance. 
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Considerable strategic experimentation of the past decade, both by state 
and non-state actors, heralded new forms of contestation, including le-
gal and information contexts, that involve state instruments of influence 
deployed on and off the battlefield. The accelerated battle rhythm of the 
second decade of the 20th century also spurred the emergence and the 
adoption of new forms of  command and control that seamlessly exploit 
high tech tools combined with low tech social forms of organisational 
adaptation.
The other link between Fuller and our work is manifest as a warning. In 
Fuller’s day, the full potential of the new technologies and the techniques 
that would optimise them were not embraced by the Western democratic 
powers but were utilised by their enemies. In Fuller’s case, it was the  German 
armed forces that adopted his ideas.3 It seems clear that a failure to grasp 
the implications of new technology and the systems that accompany them 
could profit those who seek to disrupt and defeat the West, and the values 
the West seeks to uphold, and thus destroy all that was so hard won in the 
20th century.
Despite our obsession with the latest technologies and their potential, 
war is still driven by humans. It is the human dimension that will surely 
assert itself in war in the near future just as it does in the present. There 
are plenty of critics of this view. Some technologists and philosophers warn 
that we may be approaching the end of a period when humans could make 
the critical decisions, since AI-enabled robotics may have the capacity to 
replace us. But another way to see this is to remember that humans are a 
form of technology, that is bio-technology, and it is conceivable that we will 
see a merging of hardware, software, and human tech, in the same way that 
humans embraced aviation or mechanisation, creating an almost seamless 
military instrument in the process. Much of this remains speculation but 
academic research, as in this volume, can help us navigate these issues based 
on analyses of how the interaction between human and machines is already 
reshaping the conduct of war.
Kinetic actors and new strategies: regulars, irregulars, 
and great powers
The volume reflects on the conflicts of the first two decades of the  century. 
One important element here has been the military role in  counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism. The ‘global war on terror’ was led by the  military, 
but critics suggest it should perhaps have been intelligence-led, or  law- 
enforcement led (with extraditions and the co-operation of local  security 
forces), or solely by, with, and through local nationals. Direct military inter-
vention by Western armed forces produced protracted insurgencies against 
perhaps democratically elected, but frail governments fostered by Western 
powers in Baghdad and Kabul that were unable to establish control over 
the territories under their nominal dominion. The very small footprint of 
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Western intervention forces in Iraq following the US withdrawal in 2011 
meant that there was little to stop abuses of power, prevent armed unrest, 
or halt the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in 2014. The insurgent 
movements that sprung up had draconian rules and systems of governance 
and could only be halted by force. However, it also became clear that local 
partners of the West had their own agendas, even when they claimed to 
be battling a common enemy, showing how the use of locals as surrogates 
for Western military power can sometimes be misplaced. Yet, the notion 
that governments of the global south, facing insurgency, can always manage 
alone also proved to be erroneous.
In the short term, it is governance that must be prioritised to defeat 
 insurgency with the grievances that gave rise to the fighting addressed. The 
transformative change needed to expunge insurgency is a long-term endeav-
our, a form of ‘nation (re)building’, rather than limited ‘state building’ of 
institutions. The assistance that can be offered by external powers can take 
many forms, but the specific military contribution, known collectively as 
‘security force assistance’ or ‘security sector reform’, has been shown to be 
far from straightforward. Moreover, offering assistance in the development 
of a domestic law enforcement or intelligence service has also proven to 
be  problematic. The second decade of the 21st century saw the progressive 
internationalisation of intrastate conflicts – a quintupling according to 
Uppsala’s Conflict Data Programme – in which external actors intervened 
in local conflicts for more explicit geopolitical objectives, shifting the  focus 
from stabilisation missions to the strategic and moral vagaries involved 
in war by proxy.4 This volume therefore examines how the dynamics of 
 nation building and counterinsurgency missions of the 2000s have morphed 
into proxy conflicts in the 2010s and considers how third party – state and 
 non-state – actors vie for influence, with deployed kinetic and non-kinetic 
instruments, to achieve their political objectives.
The 2010s were characterised by a shift towards interstate ‘Great Powers’ 
confrontation and the coercion of smaller states. Much would have been 
recognisable in Fuller’s day, but new tools and contexts made the situation 
by 2020 extremely volatile. The United States and its Western allies have 
been driven to protect their interests, while China has been guilty of an 
over-optimism in its ambitions which was interrupted by the global covid 
pandemic. Russia’s policies are driven more by anxiety than ambition, while 
the emerging countries of the global south are driven more by domestic 
pressures. While kinetic confrontations are rare, because of the risks in-
volved, the major powers have made more extensive use of other tools to 
further their respective agendas, including cyber, information campaigns, 
proxy actors, and an arms race in new technologies. There has been some 
probing of Western resolve and its defensive systems, usually in situations 
where the West has failed to avoid resolute or clear responses. Yet there is 
no doubt that, by 2020, there was an evident confrontation with episodes of 
coercion underway.
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Connected: command, control, communications, surveillance, 
and information
Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities are essential to contemporary war 
fighting. Surprisingly, some aspects of how technological advances in C4ISR 
are changing the conduct of conflict, and disrupting tactical and strategic 
actions, remain understudied. Improvements in C4ISR have, for example, 
driven negative side effects of strategic compression, that is, the tempta-
tion for senior leaders to micromanage tactical activities on the one hand 
and the tendency to confuse tactical success with strategic effectiveness on 
the other. Communications and surveillance capabilities have also led to 
other developments. We have seen the extensive use of remote and persis-
tently deployable, pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
which link higher headquarters to individual vehicles, airframes, vessels, 
and squads. Deployable systems with full network access across a greater 
bandwidth, with the ability to exploit granular data, have been increasingly 
evident in the battlespaces of the 2010s.
Parallel to this development, there has been renewed focus on informa-
tion warfare and psychological messaging. In strategic terms, information 
operations are increasingly conducted against civilian populations through 
greater connectivity. In the battlespace, information warfare can affect the 
efficiency of command and control, situational awareness, and the morale 
of military personnel.
When communications, surveillance, connectivity, and information 
 warfare are combined, they breed a more integrated system of sensors, 
 enablers, and effectors. The boundaries between electronic, space, air, land, 
and sea domains are slowly but steadily broken down to the extent that 
all actions are simultaneously tactical and strategic, expanding what was 
known as the ‘operational’ dimension. The most prevalent doctrinal trend 
has been towards accelerated, multi-domain operations.
This has serious implications for the time available for commands. 
 General James Cartwright, former US Vice Chair of the Joint Staff, 
 predicted that ‘the decision cycle of the future is not going to be minutes … 
The decision cycle of the future is going to be microseconds’.5 Fears that 
humans will not keep up with the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) 
loop of decision-making are often repeated.6 The phenomenon has been de-
scribed as ‘hyper-war’.7 There may be a requirement to devolve command 
to a far greater extent, to allow subordinates greater license to operate, 
so as to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities. Still, some tactical events 
have been conducted at rapid speeds, with negligible effects at the strategic 
level, and they have not always demanded responses at the same speed from 
more  senior decision-makers. Indeed, tactical events, while moving quickly, 
can be set in motion to distract an enemy leader who has a preference for 
 interventions in tactical decisions, and this can be subsequently exploited 
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with more strategic actions. Conceptually, these developments imply a sig-
nificance for control, pressure, resistance, and flow, and these are perhaps 
most evident in cyber and electromagnetic operations.
Cyber and electromagnetic activity have been used extensively by state 
actors but also by violent non-state actors because of relatively low entry 
costs to achieve tactical effects from afar. This has given rise to more persis-
tent cyber skirmishes, not just in a traditional military sphere, but across the 
fields of security and defence, which have been barely visible to the public 
eye, as well as meddling in national information domains, which has gained 
wider public attention.
In the first decades of the century, the priority has been to see where 
 security might be enhanced against espionage, interference, sabotage 
by malware, as well as malign information campaigns. Where data is the 
 currency of cyber, so criminal enterprises have sometimes linked up with 
malign state actors, which, in turn, made clear that extending coalitions 
and partnerships, across sectors (public and private, military and civilian, 
 nationally and internationally) is the way forward. At the same time, the 
past period also exposed difficulties associated with speedy attribution of 
cyberattack and information attack as well as challenges related to contain-
ment and proportionate response, and the need to further develop 20th- 
century concepts of deterrence to make them effective in the cyber domain. 
These issues, including deterrence through the threat of retaliatory action, 
through attribution, preparation for certain common types of cyberattack, 
and the rules regulating targeting practices in cyber space in and outside of 
war, are examined in this volume.
The synthetic: robotics and artificial intelligence
Autonomous sustainment on land, in the sea, and in the air promises greater 
mobility and less dependence on lines of communication. Over the past two 
decades the use of robots and autonomous systems has become more prev-
alent in conflict theatres around the world. Over a hundred states possess 
military aerial drones for C4SIR purposes, while at least three dozen of 
them have weaponised remotely piloted air systems for strike purposes.8 
For ground manoeuvre, multi-role vehicles for clearance or fighting are 
being developed, while new variants of robotic counter-IED systems have 
emerged to defeat a new generation of mines. In protection, new armour 
and lightweight textiles, protective AAD, and counter UAV are already de-
ployed. The implications are that many systems can be automated, reducing 
manpower demands in combat forces (although technical ‘tails’ tend to in-
crease), while increasing the mobility and capability of units. Automation 
also assists in the virtual realm, generating materials, disabling networks, 
creating new or repairing old networks, enhancing situational awareness, 
generating deception (especially signals deception), and creating noise to 
conceal communications through replicating tasks.
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It is widely believed that future conventional combat will consist of 
 robotic battles, directed by humans.9 The ability to exploit errors and 
 vulnerabilities in enemy robotics or their command and communications 
systems will likely also generate precisely the same friction and chance as in 
previous wars, with episodes of great intensity and destruction followed by 
periods of stand-off or manoeuvre. Under certain conditions, robotics offer 
the  opportunity to make stealthy insertions, reduce the risk of  casualties, 
 conduct persistent monitoring and surveillance. Self-directing underwater 
and air vehicles, with or without ordnance aboard, can enhance global reach 
and assist in manoeuvre. Air and ground systems can navigate  complex ur-
ban terrain while simultaneously monitoring electronic and heat signatures, 
with greater degrees of accuracy and fidelity. But none of these systems are 
without technical vulnerabilities. Our volume looks at how unmanned 
 systems and robots have been used in recent battle zones around the world 
including in the Middle East and North Africa and how they are impacting 
upon the conduct of war.
Alongside these implications for unmanned systems, the volume also 
considers how new technologies are reshaping decision cycles. One area of 
concern that attracts considerable attention is AI. Some see new military 
opportunities in these assets, while others are more alarmed by its disrup-
tion. In simple terms, basic AI is already in service, but strong or adaptive 
AI remains elusive.10 AI already assists in identification, problem-solving, 
pattern recognition, and calculations. But intelligence is characterised as 
being reactive, predictive, and creative. Currently AI can sense and act, so 
it is reactive, but its predictive and creative capacities remain limited, espe-
cially in the battle space.
All technology is, of course, integral as a weapon or enabler in war but 
there is often a trade-off in its value and use. At the tactical level, there is 
evident utility in AI in situational awareness, monitoring, control of loiter-
ing systems, and analysis of vast data. The enhancement to analysis offered 
by AI and automation is well-established, and have immediate military 
applications in intelligence, navigation, targeting, fire control, communica-
tions, and transportation. However, humans are still required to provide the 
close support, or close quarter combat, of ground war, and will retain the 
 decision-making capacity in most situations, even when AI applications can 
provide guidance. AI will require built-in safeguards to ensure that errors 
are minimised, and the ethical standards of war will still apply in situations 
where AI becomes pervasive. That said, some foresee that the introduction 
of more sophisticated AI will change the conduct of war, through speed of 
decisions, responsibilities, and ability to discriminate. Overall, the consen-
sus so far is that AI should not be offered the role of judgement and value, 
unless risks are low, and judgement should be retained by humans. Our 
 volume examines how military AI applications have reshaped OODA loops 
in recent conflicts, and how military strategists are pondering its future in-
tegration for competitive advantage.
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It is striking that human decision-making features as prominently for 
our authors as the fascination with AI. The challenges of command at the 
 operational and tactical level are well known, in classic warfighting or in 
problematic insurgencies where there are large numbers of civilians with un-
certain allegiances or levels of participation in the conflict. At the strategic 
level there has been a preponderance of theory but strategic practice is a fea-
ture of this work, with studies of how decisions are actually made, including 
under conditions of deep uncertainty where even the fundamental parame-
ters are not known. Contrasting themes reveal fascinating variations in how 
to assess and manage change and adaptation, and they tell us much about 
comparative approaches within Western professional military education.
Framing military thought on the conduct of war
In tracking change across the kinetic, the connected, and the synthetic, 
we should not forget those aspects of war that always assert themselves. 
 Friction intervenes in conflict. Things go wrong, individuals fail,  mechanical 
 systems break down, and attrition imposes itself in all operations, leading 
to culmination. In its fundamental Clausewitzian elements, war consists of 
reason, passion, and chance, a ‘wonderous’ or ‘remarkable’ trinity in con-
stant  tension and therefore prone to unexpected outcomes. Wars involve a 
variety of actors, each with various agendas or ends which, in conflict, will 
generate a further set of dynamics. So much of war in the early 20th cen-
tury would have been recognisable to JFC Fuller: with military personnel 
grappling with control, pressure, and resistance. In conflicts in the 2000s in 
Syria, Iraq, Libya, or sub-Saharan Africa, despite the novelty of new and 
emerging technologies, the elements of the nature of war were present. In 
Syria and Iraq, for example, the allegiance and the cohesion of the people 
were important, the political purpose of governance was still extant, and 
the conflicts were sacralised perhaps even more intensely than those of the 
1990s. Did technology determine the outcomes of these conflicts? To some 
extent it did. Rebels in Syria were overmatched by precise and overwhelm-
ing fires, and the belligerents made use of new technological innovations. 
Yet, on the other hand, resistance to the Syrian regime was not driven by the 
issue of new technology alone. Few would deny that the human element was 
still the most significant single aspect of the conflict.
Amongst the comparisons that can be made between war in the indus-
trial age and in the information age, there are several that are conceptually 
prominent. First, we can observe in particular how, in the past, major pow-
ers enjoyed technological supremacy over others, but, periodically, in the 
conflicts of the early 21st century, there was a degree of parity at the tactical 
level. Second, in industrial war, information operations were delivered to 
a well-defined and identifying audience confined to individual states, but 
in the 21st century the same information was available to a global, criti-
cal, and sceptical audience. Third, wars for the people now appear to be 
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wars amongst the people. Where wars were defined by allegiance or  identity 
defined by nation states, with distinct ideologies, regionally defined, we 
now observe increasingly connected peoples, sharing transnational ideas 
 globally, with mass appeal. Fourth, in industrial conflicts, human-speed 
decisions were the norm, but today, accelerated decisions through an 
 integrated human-electronic interface are common. Finally, there is an 
emerging global surveillance array, and global strike, which those in previ-
ous eras would have found hard to conceive. Current cyber operations are 
facilitating espionage, disruption, and surprise, but we are seeing code wars 
with much greater effects, enhanced deception, and stealth, with significant 
 consequences for civilian governance and state integrity.
What has survived from the past is the power of the cognitive and the 
emotional element in war – another theme reflected upon in this volume 
based on considerable progress in the cognitive and emotions sciences of 
the past two decades. The focus of much thinking about war today, just as 
in the inter-war years, is the psychological element, as influence, subversion, 
dissonance, or some more extreme shattering of morale.
One of the challenges for the West is how to manage a major operational 
setback caused by surprise. This is no idle concern: every major war has 
begun with a major setback for the Western powers. As the recent past indi-
cates, we can anticipate more technological breakthroughs in the next few 
decades, in robotics, information technology, AI and cognitive science, and 
materials. These could be combined to achieve persistent C4ISR, decep-
tion, greater tactical speed and accuracy, better protection, and a stronger 
emphasis on air mobility (as other forms of mobility seem likely to remain 
relatively unchanged). If, however, enhanced fires and communications out-
strip manoeuvre and protection, it could produce periods of stalemate and 
consequently greater attrition. In terms of expected effects, many predict 
the further compression of time, leaving less room for decision-making at 
the tactical level and hence a ‘hyper war’ of dependence on automated sys-
tems. Cyberattacks are limited today but it is easy to imagine a much more 
devastating role for cyber when more and more of the world is connected 
and dependent on linked systems. Indeed, new forms of connectivity could 
even promise a Blitzkrieg effect, as enemies are left with slow, human-speed 
systems. Connectivity also enhances the role of subversion and propaganda, 
eroding confidence in leaders or authorities.
Military thought from the past shows that, while technological- 
determinist interpretations of war are common, they are not enough to 
understand war and its evolution.11 It is easy to refer to new developments 
in weapons as marking turning points in the conduct of war.12 All too of-
ten, however, technological failures are overlooked.13 Humans will also find 
ways to outwit robotics and AI systems, just as surely as they have taken on 
apparently superior military forces in the past.14 The singularity of certain 
technologies or systems can lead to a dangerous over-dependence. For ex-
ample, advanced air power, whilst influential, did not fulfil the expectations 
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of its advocates as a conflict-winning weapon system on its own, and ‘joint’ 
operations have invariably been the most effective, hence the American 
 interest in ‘multi-domain battle’. Technologies confer certain advantages, 
and may even be essential to selected outcomes, but they do not, on their 
own, constitute a solution in every case. Their combination with other sys-
tems (such as communications), personnel (specialists), techniques (such as 
tactics), and situation (in, for example, the common objective of a coalition, 
or part of a grand strategy) is a more certain guarantee of success. Above 
all, a clear set of goals and an adroit strategy remain fundamental.
The solution to so many of these apparently technical challenges is, 
as the classic authors of military thought have shown, to return to the 
 centrality of the human in war. The human is the motive force and the point 
of  vulnerability. Despite the advocates of a decisive battle in war, brought 
about through breaking an adversary, physically and morally, such an out-
come is rare in practice and often very costly. Today, we might place greater 
emphasis on compelling an enemy to change his mind. This might be through 
paralysis, deterrence, disruption or his demoralisation, or might simply be 
by presenting choices and options, which are themselves shaped, offered, or 
limited, according to one’s strategic intent.
There are measurable strategic designs to achieve the objective of compel-
ling choice. The most obvious, and perhaps over-used as the luxury of the 
strong, is escalation, and its consequent focus on annihilation or attrition. 
An alternative is exhaustion (wearing out through time, resources, willing-
ness, or containment). Another is inflexion (to tilt, to manoeuvre, or to seize 
an opportunity that changes the parameters for the enemy). Yet another is 
deception (with false fronts, obscuration, multiple axes), or contradiction 
(where ambiguity, harassment, and multi-tempo actions are used), or reflex-
ion (where one uses the enemy’s weight against him, or he is drawn in, goaded, 
or ‘wrong-footed’). There may also be a strategy of persuasion, where allies, 
partners, and coalitions are formed, diplomacy exercised, and international 
bodies brought to bear.
To defeat the adversaries of the near future, military forces and their 
 enablers will need to attack the central operating system, namely the mind, 
just as Fuller already suggested 100 years ago. The routes to do this, and 
thus compel the target to make a choice which is compliant, can be to in-
duce hesitation or paralysis through fear or confusion; to deter by appealing 
to an adversary’s risk-calculus; to demoralise by depriving the adversary 
of information, fuel, or health; or to create options that influence their 
choices and render them predictable. This volume will reiterate that war 
is a  combination of the human, the physical tools, the environments, and 
the cognitive frameworks. In its conduct, it remains a kinetic activity, in 
the sense of both physical force and the flow of information and physical 
elements. It will certainly be characterised by new synthetic elements – AI, 
information deception, new materials, and virtual system. Above all, as 
in the past, war and politics will be about connectivity: human networks, 
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economic networks, and communicative networks. These elements will 
 reappear in different forms in the future of war, but their nature remains 
extant. They can be tackled together, combined in various ways, or utilised 
individually to produce significant changes.
The unifying thread for this volume is therefore an intellectual framework 
for the conduct of war. It is concerned with how military and related actions 
are carried out and how they are understood. Whereas the kinetic, the con-
nected, and the synthetic function as cross-cutting principles for thinking 
about war, this book, as aforementioned, is divided into different parts that 
each deal with a germane theme in the conduct of 21st-century war. To aid the 
reader, the individual chapters each follow the following format: (1) they state 
clearly the insight offered by the chapter in an opening paragraph, (2) they 
lay out the intellectual challenge of thinking about war in the context of the 
chapter, (3) they examine either the human dimension or the technological 
dimension, or both, and show how the thinking about war is changing, has 
changed, or requires change, and (4) they then offer concluding reflections 
that relate to the conduct of armed conflict to illustrate their specific context.
The chapters that follow are scholarly and authoritative, but not exhaus-
tive or artificially theorised, in order to create an accessible interpretation 
of the conduct of war. They cohere to address the three most fascinating 
and disputed ideas which are subject to intense debate at this point in the 
 century: namely, the relative impact of those elements of war which are 
 kinetic, synthetic, and connected.
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